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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the typical industry in dire need of government interven-
tion to spare it from the onslaught of foreign imports. Perhaps the im-
age which entered your mind is that of an antique industrial throwback
languishing somewhere in the Rust Belt. Probably your last thought
would be of the gleaming clean-rooms of Silicon Valley, the stronghold
of the American semiconductor industry. Yet it is precisely that sector,
often touted as America's high-tech hope for prosperity into the next
century, which has become the latest recipient of government protec-
tion from foreign competition.
This article explains how such an event has come about. It ex-
plores the state of the U.S. semiconductor industry and its attempt to
ward off foreign competitors through the use of U.S. trade laws. It ex-
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amines how, through allegations of semiconductor dumping and closed
Japanese markets, the government was able to negotiate a bilateral
agreement with Japan to essentially cartelize the world semiconductor
market. This agreement could hardly live up to expectations, both in
terms of enforcing the agreement and in providing the relief actually
desired by the U.S. industry. This experience is compared with previous
attempts to protect the automobile and steel sectors from foreign com-
petition by means of similar agreements. Finally, alternative responses
are suggested which may offer better solutions for maintaining U.S.
leadership in the world semiconductor sector.
II. THE STATE OF THE U.S. SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
While the United States was once the undisputed leader in state-
of-the-art microelectronics technology, it is now clinging to a precip-
itously declining share of the $30 billion world market in mass-manu-
factured semiconductors. Since 1978, Japan has increased its market
share from 28 to 50 percent, while the United States' share has
dropped from 55 to 44 percent.1 In 1985 and 1986, during a worldwide
recession in semiconductors, U.S. companies lost more than $1 billion,
putting more than 60,000 employees out of work.2
The United States has lost ground particularly in key sectors of
the semiconductor market. In 1975, U.S. companies controlled 90 per-
cent of the world market for dynamic random access memory
"DRAM" chips, the ubiquitous integrated circuits that allow com-
puters to store, remember and change data. By 1986, that share had
shriveled to 5 percent as U.S. companies faced stiff competition from
Japan, other Pacific Rim countries, and even European countries.'
The implications of a downturn in the semiconductor industry
reach deeply into the entire U.S. economy. Semiconductors are an inte-
gral part of the electronics industry, which in 1986 accounted for 15
percent of the U.S. industrial output.4 The semiconductor industry's ec-
onomic importance has enabled it to appeal to Washington for help in
dealing with foreign competitors, and the U.S. industry has no stronger
competitor than the Japanese. In 1983 the Japanese began to penetrate
1. Dallmeyer, National Security and the Semiconductor Industry, 90 TECHNOL-
OGY REV. 47 (1987).
2. See Financial Times, Oct. 29, 1986, at 22.
3. See U.S. DEPT. OF DEFENSE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISI-
TION, REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON DEFENSE SEMICON-
DUCTOR DEPENDENCY 5 (1987) [hereinafter DSB REPORT].
4. FORTUNE, Apr. 13, 1987, at 89. This percentage amounted to $250 billion.,
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the U.S. market for semiconductors while rapidly expanding their man-
ufacturing capacity.' Even the basic internal structure of the industry
favors Japan, where vertically integrated companies predominate.' Jap-
anese manufacturers design and fabricate massive quantities of semi-
conductors not only for export but also for their affiliates to incorporate
into finished products.7 In contrast the U.S. industry is fragmented into
high-volume merchant companies that sell semiconductors to other
manufacturers, a few Japanese-style vertically integrated companies,
semi-custom manufacturers, and design or process specialists.8 This di-
versity may appeal to American pride in independence but impedes the
large-scale research and development necessary to compete in this high
technology field.
Aside from this diversity, fundamental differences between the
Japanese and U.S. economies have contributed to the decline of the
domestic semiconductor industry. One major factor is the high cost of
investment capital in the United States which occurs in part because
Americans save only about 5 percent of their income compared with
the Japanese average of 15 percent.9 In addition, Japanese semiconduc-
tor companies belong to huge conglomerates. The major banks that
head these organizations are ready sources of low interest research and
development ("R & D") funds. Japanese semiconductor companies re-
invest twice as much as a percentage of sales in manufacturing technol-
ogy 10 as their U.S. counterparts and about ten percent more on semi-
conductor research and development.11
A second and related structural difference is that Japanese inves-
tors accept a much lower and slower return on investments. During
industry reversals, stockholder demands mean that U.S. companies
strive to maintain short-term profitability, while Japanese companies
preserve market share for future recovery. 2
5. U.S. CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE BENEFITS AND RISKS
OF FEDERAL FUNDING FOR SEMATECH 11 (1987). This study of proposed funding for
semiconductor manufacturing technology presents an excellent overview of the U.S.
and Japanese semiconductor industry [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
6. See DSB REPORT, supra note 3, at 76-78. For an excellent overview of the
differences between the U.S. and Japanese semiconductor industries, see ELECTRONICS,
Apr. 2, 1987, at 62-68, 76-78.
7. See CBO REPORT, supra note 5, at 12-14.
8. See id. at 16.
9. DSB REPORT, supra note 3, at 73 (based on Commerce Department statistics).
10. Id. at 46.
11. Id. at 57.
12. Id. at 87.
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III. U.S. TRADE CASES AGAINST JAPAN
As Japanese firms began to make inroads into the U.S. semicon-
ductor industry in the early 1980's, U.S. producers responded to this
competition with a spate of actions before the Department of Com-
merce ["Commerce"] and the International Trade Commission
["ITC"]. The opening salvo in the trade war came with the filing by
the Semiconductor Industry Association ["SIA"] of a complaint under
section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 to stop Japan's alleged discrimi-
nation against U.S. suppliers. Shortly thereafter SIA and other indus-
try petitioners followed up with allegations that the Japanese were
dumping semiconductors, selling chips at less than fair market value in
the United States and in third countries. This section will examine the
industries' decision to pursue relief through the United States trade
laws.
A. Section 301
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to
act to end unfair trade policies of foreign governments.13 For relief to
be granted, the unfair practices must fall outside the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws and must be attributable to government, not
private, actions.1 4 Additionally, section 301 applies to actions of all
countries regardless of whether they are signatories to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").1 5
Examples of unfair practices actionable under section 301 include
import restrictions, unfair tariff preferences to third countries, subsidi-
zation of product sales in third-country markets where U.S. goods also
compete, and prohibition of export sales to the U.S. of the foreign
product. 6 The list also includes failure to allow the establishment of, or
failure to protect U.S. intellectual property rights and the denial of na-
tional or most-favored-nation treatment. 7 Section 301 is also used to
enforce U.S. rights under existing trade agreements or to respond to
13. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2416. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For general descrip-
tions of § 301, see Horlick el al., A Manual of U.S. Trade Laws, INT'L Bus. LAW.
257-58 (1985); [Reference File] INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 49:0101-49:0105 (June 28,
1988). Section 301 was substantially altered by the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988, Pub.L. No. 100-418, Title I, §§ 1301-1307 (1988) [hereinafter "1988
Act"].
14. See INT'L TRADE REP. 49:0101.
15. See Horlick, supra note 13 at 257.
16. See INT'L TRADE REP., supra note 13, at 49:0101.
17. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
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practices by foreign countries which deny benefits under such agree-
ments.1 8 Where agreements exist, the statute calls such unfair practices
"unjustifiable," meaning those that are inconsistent with international
legal rights of the United States.19 In the absence of an agreement, the
President may still act to remedy any unreasonable or discriminatory
practice which burdens or restricts U.S. commerce.2 0 This language has
been interpreted to mean any inequitable practice that is at least nor-
matively wrong in some sense.2 1 Although this language is somewhat
vague, the drafters prevented section 301 from being overly broad by
requiring that the unfair practice also place some burden on com-
merce. 2 On the other hand, there is no opportunity for review of the
President's determination that a practice is "unreasonable. 2 3
Although a section 301 complaint may be initiated on the Presi-
dent's own motion,24 most investigations commence upon petition by a
private party.25 Some commentators note that this petition process al-
lows private citizens to directly enforce GATT dispute settlement rights
normally reserved to governments.26 Apparently, by adding the right of
private petition, Congress indicated that the Executive Branch had not
protected U.S. interests as extensively as it might have. 7
The office of the U.S. Trade Representative ("U.S.T.R.") ad-
ministers section 301 investigations. 8 In the case of a private petition
for relief, if the U.S.T.R. goes forward with the investigation involving
an existing trade agreement, it must also pursue concurrently a consul-
tation with the foreign government in an attempt to resolve the dis-
pute.29 If the conflict is not resolved, the U.S.T.R. must then request
the initiation of formal dispute resolution procedures either under the
GATT or alternatives named in the agreement.3 The investigation in-
18. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
19. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) and 2411(e)(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
20. Id.
21. For an extensive discussion of the meaning of these terms in § 301, see Hudec,
Retaliating Against "Unreasonable" Foreign Trade Practices: The New Section 301
and GATT Nullification and Impairment, 59 MINN. L. REV. 461, 518-22 (1975).
22. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
23. See Hudec, supra note 21, at 521-22.
24. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
25. See id. at § 2412(a); Horlick et al., supra note 13, at 57.
26. 26.See GREY, UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY LEGISLATION: A CANADIAN
VIEW 75 (1982).
27. Id.; Hudec, supra note 21, at 510-li.
28. 19 U.S.C. §2412 (Supp. IV 1986). The role of the U.S. Trade Representative
has been expanded significantly by the 1988 Act. See 1988 Act, supra note 13.
29. 19 U.S.C. § 2413(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
30. Id.
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cludes the opportunity for a public hearing.3" The statute also specifies
time limits for investigation in order to ensure prompt settlement of the
dispute.32
Following the investigation, the U.S.T.R. makes recommendations
to the President for his final action."3 The President often seeks the
advice of private sector representatives. 34 He may also request the ad-
vice of the ITC regarding the probable economic impact of a decision
to grant relief under section 301.3
If the President determines that there is an unfair trade practice,
he must act to remedy it. 6 Under the statute he is authorized to take
all appropriate and feasible action to permanently remedy the situa-
tion. 7 The President may suspend, withdraw or prevent the application
of benefits due under any existing agreement for trade concessions with
the foreign country.38 He may impose duties or other import restric-
tions on the products and services of that country.39 With respect to
services, the President may prospectively restrict the terms and condi-
tions or deny the issuance of access authorization such as licenses or
permits for the U.S. market.40 He may take this action on a most-fa-
vored-nation basis or may restrict the remedy to a specified foreign
country. 1
The unfair trade practice which triggered the section 301 action
by SIA was the alleged industrial targeting of the semiconductor indus-
try by the Japanese government. Industrial targeting consists of coordi-
nated government actions which direct productive resources toward se-
lected industries to increase production and improve competitiveness.'
Targeting should not be confused with industrial policy. Industrial pol-
icy generally confers benefits on a wide range of industries; in contrast,
31. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
32. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Time limits range from 7
months for investigations of export subsidies up to one year for other types of investiga-
tions. Id.
33. Id.
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(b)(3) (1982).
36. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
37. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
39. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
40. Id.
41. See 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
42. For an exhaustive treatment of Japanese targeting practices, see U.S. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, Foreign Industrial Targeting and its Effects on U.S. Industries -
Phase 1: Japan, U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1437 (Oct. 1983).
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targeting focuses on a narrow range of interests."'
The government helps targeted industries by providing preferential
tax treatment, outright subsidies, loans to finance activities such as re-
search and development or export sales, special legal treatment such as
antitrust exemptions, preferences in government procurement, and im-
port restrictions." These practices are used to increase market share in
domestic sales or to increase export sales in foreign markets. Since sec-
tion 301 is designed to enforce U.S. access to foreign markets, it ap-
plies directly to unfair practices which seek to restrict U.S. competition
abroad. Thus section 301 allows the United States to threaten to retali-
ate against targeting practices before U.S. products are injured in the
marketplace. 5
The Japanese semiconductor industry is one sector which has ben-
efited from government targeting. In its efforts to build its domestic
computer industry, the Japanese government used high tariffs, restric-
tive quotas, and foreign investment restrictions until 1976 when these
restrictions were ended.46 Since the repeal of these tactics, the main
targeting activity has been government-funded cooperative research
and development. 7
In 1983, the SIA released a report which called for U.S. interven-
tion to end targeting practices of the Japanese government in the semi-
conductor sector.4 8 The SIA report charged that the Japanese govern-
ment sanctioned unfair subsidies, granted improper tax advantages,
and restricted the domestic market.49 The report called for the termina-
tion of preferential treatment for Japanese companies in the Japanese
domestic market, enforcement of U.S. rights under GATT, and new
legislation covering targeting.5" In response to the U.S. report, the
Electronic Industries Association of Japan replied that the U.S. De-
partment of Defense had supported the infant U.S. semiconductor in-
dustry with research expenditures that dwarfed the money given by the
Japanese government to its domestic producers.51 It found that U.S.
tax exemptions were even more favorable than those granted by the
43. It should be noted, however, that there is no absolute dividing line between the
two practices. See id. at 17-18.
44. See id. at 17.
45. See id. at 42.
46. See id. at 133-34.
47. See id. at 148-50 (description of research projects).
48. See 7 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 601-02 (Feb. 9, 1983).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See JAPAN INST. FOR SOCIAL AND ECON. AFFAIRS, KEIZAi KOHO CENTER
BRIEF No.6 (Apr. 1983).
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Japanese. 52 It also noted that the United States spends three times as
much in total research and development. 53 It attributed the sluggish
sales of U.S. products in Japan to price competitiveness problems and
failure to promote U.S. products in Japan.6 '
In an attempt to resolve the conflicts over Japanese subsidies and
restriction of market access, the United States and Japan formed a bi-
lateral working group on high technology. 55 Negotiations resulted in a
mutual agreement to eliminate the 4.2 percent duty on semiconductors
in order to encourage increased trade in the high technology sector.
Both countries agreed to provide information for potential foreign in-
vestors and to discourage unfair copying of semiconductor products.
56
The suspension of the tariff, however, was not implemented until
1985. 57
Meanwhile, the Japanese rapidly increased their semiconductor
production capacity. 58 This increase in capacity along with a worldwide
downturn in demand raised fears among American producers that Ja-
pan was about to flood the market with low-priced products. To fore-
stall this threat, in June 1985 the SIA filed a section 301 complaint
which alleged that, despite negotiations, the Japanese government's an-
ticompetitive measures had restricted U.S. entry into the Japanese
market.5 9 The SIA charged that the Japanese government had ex-
tended preferential treatment to firms in that country and that Japa-
nese companies themselves continued to relegate U.S. suppliers to posi-
tions as back-up sources only, adopting a de facto "buy national"
stance.
In response to the complaint, Japanese semiconductor producers
asserted that the SIA petition amounted to a request for a guaranteed
share of the Japanese market.60 Additionally Japanese respondents
faulted the market share figures in the petition for failing to include
sales of semiconductors made by large U.S. firms located in Japan and
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See JAPAN INST. FOR SOCIAL AND ECON. AFFAIRS, KEIZAI KOHO CENTER
BRIEF No. 6 (Apr. 1983); also id., BRIEF No. 8 (June 1983) (statement of Masaya
Miyoshi, managing director of Keidanren). See also 20 U.S. EXPORT WKLY. (BNA)
912-13 (May 1, 1984) (U.S. inflation and tax policy the real problem).
55. See Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1983, at 31; 8 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 630-31
(July 20, 1983).
56. The Japan Times, Nov. 9, 1983, at 7.
57. See Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 12, 1985, at 24.
58. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 606 (May 1, 1985).
59. See id. at 807-08 (June 19, 1985).
60. Id. at 1070 (Aug. 28, 1985).
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production of semiconductors by so-called "captive" firms in the United
States, who manufacture chips for their own internal use.61
B. Antidumping
The governmental negotiations called for by section 301 were fur-
ther complicated by the filing of three antidumping complaints alleging
sales of Japanese semiconductor components at less than fair market
value. While the negotiations regarding the allegations in the section
301 petition were difficult enough, the push for a comprehensive solu-
tion that encompassed these new complaints greatly increased the
problems.
In general, the antidumping laws encompass a set of procedures
designed to make two determinations.62 The first question is whether
merchandise is being "dumped," meaning sold at less than fair value
("LTFV"). 3 Second, the dumped goods must be causing or threaten-
ing to cause "material injury" to a United States industry.6" If these
two requirements are met, a duty is imposed to offset the LTFV sales.6 5
The International Trade Administration ("ITA") determines whether
or not merchandise is being dumped, and the ITC, an independent fed-
eral agency composed of six commissioners, determines material
injury. 6
An antidumping proceeding may be initiated by an interested
party who files a petition simultaneously with the ITA and ITC. 7 Ad-
ditionally, the ITA may initiate an investigation on its own.68 Normally
an investigation proceeds in five stages. Within twenty days of the re-
ceipt of the petition, the ITA decides whether or not to initiate an in-
vestigation.6 9 The basis for its decision is whether or not the dumping
61. See id.
62. See Horlick, Summary of Procedures Under the United States Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Laws, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 828 (1984).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (2)(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In the case of the imposition of
countervailing duties, the injury requirement applies only to subsidized exports from
countries that have accepted the GATT Subsidy Code. Nonsignatories of the code are
treated more harshly in that their exports can be countervailed with a finding only that
the product receives a subsidy. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982).
65. See Horlick, supra note 62.
66. The ITC is the successor of the U.S. Tariff Commission with extensive respon-
sibilities administering the United States import relief and trade laws. It was created
under the authority of the Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (1982).
67. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b)(2) (1982).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a) (Supp. IV 1986); 19 C.F.R. § 353.35 (1987).
69. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c) (1982). See 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(a) (1987).
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allegations in the petition are supported by information reasonably
available to the petitioner.70 In the instance of a self-initiated petition,
the standard is "the information available" to the ITA.7 Should the
ITA decide not to proceed, the ITC investigation also is terminated.72
If the ITA admits the petition, the ITC has 45 days to determine
whether there is a "reasonable indication" that a domestic industry is
materially injured or is threatened with material injury.7 3 The ITC ba-
ses its preliminary finding upon questionnaires sent both to importers
and domestic interests, public hearings, and other sources.74 The first
element in its injury determination is to identify and define the domes-
tic industry.75 The statute defines industry as "the domestic producers
as a whole of a like product."'7 6 "Like product" is defined as a product
which is "like, or in the absence of like, most similar in characteristics
and uses" to the product in the petition. 7
Having defined the like product, the ITC then must define "do-
mestic industry." The domestic industry may be national, regional, or
even composed of individual producers, and may include firms which
import components or which manufacture abroad, as long as the firm
has "sufficient" production facilities within the United States.7 8
Following the definition of "like product" and "domestic indus-
try," the ITC then determines whether there is material injury or
threat thereof. Among other indicators the ITC considers are price and
profitability declines, lost sales, reduced levels of employment, and
growth of imports both in absolute and relative terms. 9
70. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(c)(1) (1982).
71. 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). See United States v. Roses, Inc.,
706 F.2d 1563, 1566 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
72. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(c)(3), 1673b(a) (1982).
73. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982).
74. The regulations provide for the maintenance of confidentiality in antidumping
and countervailing duty cases. 19 C.F.R. §§ 202.21, 207.4 and 207.7 (1987). See
Anthony & Byrne, Safeguarding Confidential Information in ITC Injury Proceedings:
Proposals to Reduce the Risks of Disclosure, 17 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 1
(1985). Confidentiality with reference to ITA proceedings is regulated by 19 C.F.R. §§
353.27, 355.17 (1987).
75. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1986).
76. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(4)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
77. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
78. The ITC, however, has discretion to include a firm that both produces and
imports the like product. Melamine in Crystal Form from Austria and Italy, final de-
termination, 2 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 5105 (1980). High Capacity Pagers from Japan, final
determination, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 721 (1983).
79. See e.g., High Capacity Pagers from Japan, 5 I.T.R.D. (BNA) 1721; The
Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F.Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade), appeal
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The final step in the injury finding is for the ITC to determine a
causal link between the material injury and the dumped merchandise.80
Imports need not be the sole cause or even the major cause of injury as
long as they are "more than a de minimis cause," which is a very low
threshold of proof.8
If its preliminary finding is negative, the ITC terminates the inves-
tigation. 82 If the ITC does find reasonable indication of injury, the in-
vestigation enters its third phase. Within 160 days of the filing of the
petition, the ITA must determine in a preliminary fashion whether
there is a "reasonable basis to believe or suspect" that the merchandise
is being sold at LTFV or is likely to be sold at LTFV.88 If this prelimi-
nary finding is in the affirmative, liquidation of duties is suspended and
bonds must be posted for the merchandise.84 On the other hand, while
a negative preliminary determination by the ITA prevents the imposi-
tion of these provisional remedies, it does not terminate the
investigation.
The fourth stage of the investigation is the ITA's final determina-
tion of sales at less than fair value. This determination must be made
within 75 days of its preliminary finding.85 If the ITA finds in the neg-
ative, the investigation is terminated.86 If the ITA finds in the affirma-
tive, the investigation proceeds to its fifth stage. At this point the ITC
must make a final determination of material injury.87 This will be
based on all relevant technical and economic testimony gathered at a
trial-like hearing only if such a hearing is requested by a party to the
after remand. 617 F.Supp. 1088 (Ct, Int'l Trade 1985).
80. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
81. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986). When effects are cumulated any
individual country's effort need only be "more than de minimis." Maine Potato Council
v. United States, 613 F. Supp. at 1243. See also, Bingham & Taylor v. United States,
627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), aftd, 815 F. 2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
82. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982).
83. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1) (1982). This period may be extended to 210 days. 19
U.S.C. § 1673b(c)(1) (1982).
84. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673b(d)(1),(2).
85. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(1) (1982). This period is subject to an extension of up
to 135 days. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(a)(2) (1982).
86. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (1982).
87. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). If the ITA preliminary
determination is in the affirmative, the ITC's final determination must be made within
120 days of that ITA determination or within 45 days of ITA's final determination,
whichever is later. Id. § 1673d(b)(2) (1982). If the ITA's preliminary determination
was in the negative, the ITC's final determination must be made within 75 days of any
affirmative determination of the ITA. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(b)(3) (1982).
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investigation. 8 The investigation is terminated if the ITC makes a neg-
ative determination."9 If the ITC does find material injury or threat of
injury by LTFV sales, the ITA issues an antidumping order and duties
are assessed.9"
Neither the ITA nor the Executive Branch may terminate an an-
tidumping investigation by fiat. The ITA also may not refuse to initiate
an investigation if the petition meets the statutory requirements.91
Once begun, an investigation may be terminated only by a negative
determination which meets statutory criteria or by the withdrawal of
the petition by the petitioning party.9 Additionally, antidumping cases
may be suspended by the ITA if the exporter revises prices upward to
eliminate the dumping margin or ceases its exports. 93 However, even if
a suspension agreement is entered into, the ITA must continue its in-
vestigation upon the request of the exporter, the domestic industry, or
any other interested party.94 These provisions which limit the ITA's
discretion to enter into suspension agreements or terminate investiga-
tions reflect the view that suspension agreements between government
and exporter may not necessarily serve the interests of the domestic
industry.95 Consequently, the U.S. antidumping laws are less conducive
to suspension agreements than the GATT Code.
Any negative preliminary determination9" or any final determina-
tion97 may be appealed to the Court of International Trade which bases
its review on whether the agency's determination is arbitrary, capri-
cious, or an abuse of discretion with reference to preliminary determi-
nations, and supported by substantial evidence with reference to final
determinations.98 Thus, the agency's view need not be the only reasona-
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1677c (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
89. 19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2) (1982).
90. Id.
91. See Roses, Inc. v. United States, 538 F.Supp. 418 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) affd
in part, rev'd in part, 706 F.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
92. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Additionally, the ITC can only
terminate an investigation after the ITA has completed its preliminary determination.
19 U.S.C. § 1673c(A)(3) (Supp. IV 1986). For an example of a withdrawal agree-
ment, see the 1982 steel settlement, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,058 (1982). See also Lightweight
Polyester Filament Fabrics from Japan, 49 Fed. Reg. 4021 (1984).
93. 19 U.S.C. § 1673c(b) (1982).
94. 19 U.S.C. § 1673(c)(g) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
95. See H.R. Rep. No. 317, 96 Cong., 1st Sess. 53-55 (1979). The House report
refers to the need to weigh the benefits of early settlement against the possible relief
resulting from a completed investigation.
96. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(l)(c) (Supp. IV 1986).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(l)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1986).
98. 19 U.S.C. § 1576a(b)(1) (1982).
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ble construction nor must it be the one the court would have chosen if
the matter had arisen before it. 9
1. 64K DRAMs
Within a month of the SIA's section 301 petition, Micron Tech-
nology, Inc. filed an antidumping complaint against seven Japanese
firms making 64K dynamic random access memories (DRAMs).'
DRAMs of various memory capacities are used extensively in computer
memories; a so-called 64K DRAM can store approximately 65,000 bits
of information. In its petition, Micron alleged that because of sales at
less than fair value, U.S. market prices had been depressed, resulting in
layoffs and loss of profits for the domestic industry.'0 1
In its preliminary determination, the ITC considered "like prod-
uct" to be all 64K DRAMs produced in the United States.10 2 By the
final investigation, however, they expanded the "like product" category
to include all capacities of DRAMs, because of interchangeability of
memory capacity, as well as unassembled DRAMs.'03 Similarly, the
ITC expanded its definition of the domestic industry from the time of
the preliminary investigation to the final investigation. Initially the ITC
included in the domestic industry merchant producers selling in the
commercial market, captive producers manufacturing for their own
consumption, and firms producing wholly or partly abroad. 04 By the
final investigation the ITC had broadened "domestic industry" to in-
clude U.S. subsidiaries of Japanese companies? °0
In its preliminary assessment of the condition of the domestic in-
dustry, the ITC was influenced by the growth of inventory coupled with
rapidly declining prices which yielded overall losses for the industry.'0
It attributed this injury to increasing imports from Japan with an ac-
99. American Lamb v. United States, 785 F. 2d 994, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Re-
public Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640, 650 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984);
Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 123, 129 (Ct. Int'l Trade
(1985).
100. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 865 (July 3, 1985).
101. Id.
102. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Compo-
nents from Japan, Investigation no. 731-TA-270 (prelim.), U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1735
(Aug. 1985), at 4 [hereinafter "64K prelim."].
103. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 64K Dynamic Random Access Memory Compo-
nents from Japan, Investigation no. 731-TA-270 (final), U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1862
(June 1986), at 8-11 [hereinafter "64K final"].
104. 64K prelim., supra note 102, at 4-7.
105. See 64K final, supra note 103, at 13.
106. See 64K prelim., supra note 102, at 9-11.
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companying price drop.107 The large fraction of the market occupied by
imports at less than fair value, plus evidence of lost sales and revenues,
led to their preliminary finding of injury due to sales of imports at less
than fair value.108 In their final determination, the ITC found material
injury based on the poor financial condition of the domestic industry,
the adverse impact of imports on prices during the period of the investi-
gation, and the particular sensitivity of the industry to decreasing prof-
itability because of high R & D expenses and the need for extensive
capital investment. 09 Upon this finding, dumping duties of 11.87 per-
cent to 35.34 percent were assessed against DRAM importers from
Japan.
2. DRAMs of 256K and Above
While the 64K DRAM investigation was proceeding through its
preliminary stages, in December 1985 Commerce initiated an an-
tidumping investigation into imports of DRAMs with capacities of
256K up to 1 megabyte. This was one of the first unfair trade investi-
gations ever initiated by Commerce." 0
In its preliminary finding the ITC defined the like product as all
DRAMs of 256K capacity and above.' By including "and above" in
the petition, Commerce and the ITC could prevent an exporter from
circumventing subsequent restrictions on imports by soldering two
256K DRAMs together to produce a "512K" DRAM falling outside
the scope of the order." 2 Thus it defined the like product as all
DRAMS, just as it had in the 64K DRAM case. Similarly, the ITC
defined domestic industry as it had in the 64K DRAM case, to include
not only purely domestic entities but also those who import DRAMs
for final assembly and those companies related to Japanese importers
and exporters." 3 In assessing the condition of the domestic industry,
the ITC found there was a net operating loss as well as a decline in
domestic shipments and capacity utilization."" Supporting its determi-
nation of injury by LTFV sales, the ITC pointed to imports of Japanese
107. See id. at 12.
108. See id. at 15.
109. See 64K final, supra note 103, at 17-20.
110. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1543-45 (Dec. 11, 1985).
111. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconduc-
tors of 256 Kilobytes and Above from Japan, Investigation no. 731-TA-300 (prelim.),
U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1803 (Jan. 1986), at 13.
112. Id. at n. 29.
113. Id. at 13-16.
114. Id. at 16-19.
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256K DRAMs increasing from 3.7 percent for 1984 to 16.9 percent for
1985 as well as dramatic price declines.' 15 While Commerce assessed
dumping duties ranging from 19.80 percent to as much as 108.72 per-
cent,116 the ITC never completed its final investigation due to the sign-
ing of a semiconductor trade accord between the United States and
Japan."'
3. Erasable, Programmable Read Only Memories
In September 1985, three U.S. semiconductor companies opened a
fourth front in the effort to bring pressure to bear on unfair competi-
tion by the Japanese. In this case the commodities in question were
erasable, programmable read-only memories ("EPROMs"), used to
store programs in computers. Initially the United States was the tech-
nology and market leader for these semiconductors; however, with in-
creasing Japanese activity in the market, by the end of October 1985
the Japanese held 60 percent of the U.S. market for 64K and 128K
EPROMs, 1"8 and per-unit prices for 256K EPROMs had plummeted
from $17 to $4 within the space of an eight month period. 9
In its preliminary finding the ITC declared that the like product
was EPROMs of all capacities. 120 It defined the domestic industry to
include both the U.S. producers as well as companies who assembled
EPROMs in the United States from imported components. 21 In
describing the state of the domestic industry, the ITC's characteriza-
tion of EPROM producers sounds a more positive note than its charac-
terization of the DRAM industry. While there was a decline in con-
sumption of lower capacity EPROMs, consumption was increasing for
higher capacity versions.'22 Likewise there was an overall increase in
production capacity, actual production, domestic shipments, and em-
ployment. 23 On the negative side, there had been a dramatic decline in
115. Id. at 21.
116. See 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 19, 1986).
117. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 136-138.
118. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 780 (June 12, 1985).
119. See id. at 1233 (October 2, 1985). One stimulus for this action was a memo
obtained from the Hitachi company urging its distributors to aggressively undersell its
competitors, even if it required offers far below cost. The memo promised distributors a
25% profit regardless of their selling price. See id. at 780 (June 12, 1985).
120. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories
from Japan, Investigation no. 731-TA-288 (prelim.), U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1778 (Nov.
1985), at 8.
121. Id. at 12.
122. Id. at 14.
123. See id. at 14-16.
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income for U.S. producers during the period of January to June 1985
compared with the same period a year earlier. 2" In 1984 eight U.S.
firms, accounting for 95 percent of U.S. shipments, reported a ratio of
operating income to net sales of 31.9 percent. By 1985 this ratio had
dropped to -3.9 percent. 2 '
As preliminary evidence of injury from sales at less than fair mar-
ket value, the ITC pointed to dramatic increases in EPROM imports
from Japan, especially in the higher capacity sector. 2 ' Additionally,
the ITC confirmed the practice of aggressive price undercutting by
Japanese producers as well as rapid growth in their EPROM manufac-
turing capability.' The accumulation of large inventories in the
United States and the great decline in profitability compounded the
existing injury with the continuing threat of future material injury to
the U.S. EPROM industry.' 28
Before the ITC could complete its final investigation, the United
States and Japan concluded negotiations resulting in the semiconductor
accord, which covered EPROMs.129 Nevertheless, the petitioners re-
quested the ITC to proceed to a final determination. By proceeding to a
final determination, the dumping finding could be revived immediately
and duties determined and assessed if the accord was terminated. 3 '
In its final determination, the ITC decided to exclude Fujitsu from
the domestic industry category because it was the only company to as-
semble EPROMs from imported Japanese components, and it did not
conduct R & D or initial fabrication of EPROMs in the United
States.1 31 Nevertheless, this exclusion had no effect on trends of per-
formance indicators for the domestic industry. 32 The ITC's characteri-
zation of the state of the domestic industry did not change markedly
from its earlier analysis. The ITC found the financial performance data
to be the strongest indicator of material injury to the industry. The
domestic industry had suffered losses across the board, consisting of
declines in sales and operating income. Indeed, for 1985 as a whole, the
124. Id. at 17.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 19.
127. See id. at 20-22.
128. See id. at 22-23.
129. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 136-138.
130. See INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1519 (Dec. 17, 1986).
131. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories
from Japan, Investigation no. 731-TA-188 (final) U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1927 (Dec.
1986), at 12 [hereinafter "EPROM final").
132. Id. at n. 25.
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ratio of operating income to net sales registered 45 percent,13 3 dramati-
cally lower than the ITC's preliminary figures.1 ' The ITC attributed
these losses to increasing Japanese import volumes and to market pene-
tration by the higher capacity chips, as well as price undercutting.1 35
IV. THE SEMICONDUCTOR ACCORD
The ITC investigations, along with threats of congressional ac-
tion, 1 36 added momentum to the negotiations begun under section 301.
Facing a June 1986 time limit on the section 301 investigation, each
party had its own negotiating positions to work out. In the weeks lead-
ing up to the accord, Japan was rumored to have offered to set up a
floor-price system on semiconductors sold in the United States, al-
though it was not clear how criteria for the floor prices would be set.
The U.S. negotiators apparently were bargaining for a guaranteed
market share in Japan for U.S. manufacturers. 3 7
By mid-year, the two countries had reached an agreement. While
the negotiating record of the Semiconductor Accord has never been
made public, much information is available. 3 The Accord, which will
be in effect through June 1991, has two main provisions. First, the
United States and Japan agreed to work together to prevent dumping
of semiconductors both in the United States and in third country mar-
kets. Second, Japan agreed to promote the expansion of the U.S. share
of the Japanese semiconductor market.
A. Antidumping
In exchange for the suspension of the antidumping investigations
on EPROMs and 256K DRAMs, the Japanese government agreed to
require their producers to sell DRAMs and EPROMs at or above their
average fair market value as calculated by Commerce.' 3 9 Under the
Accord, Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry
133. See id. at 16.
134. See supra text accompanying note 125.
135. See EPROM final, supra note 131, at 18-19.
136. By August 1985, 57 bills concerning U.S.-Japan trade awaited action before
House Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee alone. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1030 (Aug. 14, 1985).
137. For background on the negotiations, see 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 310
(Mar. 5, 1986); id. 428 (Apr. 2, 1986); id. 735 (June 4, 1986).
138. See 25 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1408-27 (1986). See also JAPAN ECON. J., July 12,
1986, at 1; Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1; 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 994-95 (Aug.
6, 1986).
139. See 25 INT'L LEG. MAT. 1427 (1986).
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("MITI") monitors costs and prices of Japanese semiconductors in the
United States as well as collects company and product-specific costs
and export data for Japanese producers.'4 0 Commerce uses MITI's sta-
tistics to determine if sales at less than fair market value occur on a
company-specific basis."" If dumping is suspected, then the United
States and Japan would enter into negotiations lasting no longer than
14 days to correct the problem." 2 Additionally, if dumping occurs in
violation of the EPROM and 256K DRAM suspension agreement,
Commerce may terminate that agreement and immediately impose an-
tidumping duties. 143 The negotiations under section 301 were also sus-
pended, although the Accord provides for periodic meetings to assess
progress."'
B. Market Access
The Accord does not state a specific percentage of the Japanese
market which the United States is guaranteed to have by 1991. Rather,
U.S. producers are to have a "steady" increase in the market."' To
accomplish this, the Japanese government agreed to establish a Japa-
nese organization to assist foreign producers in increasing sales."46 Ad-
ditionally, foreign producers will receive research and development tax
breaks and opportunities to compete for government grants on an equal
basis with Japanese producers."47 Also, foreign producers will have
equal access to patents generated by government-sponsored research." 8
Because the United States is the main semiconductor producer other
than Japan, it naturally stands to gain the most from this market share
liberalization feature.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at 1413. See also 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 994-95 (Aug. 6,
1986).
144. 25 INT'L LEG. MAT. at 1414.
145. Id. at 1410; Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1. Although it has never been
released officially, the two governments signed a side letter to the agreement in which
Japan "recognizes the U.S. semiconductor industry's expectation" of a 20 percent mar-
ket share by foreign companies 5 years after the Accord was signed. See New York
Times, Aug. 2, 1988, D7.
146. 25 INT'L LEG. MAT. at 1410; 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 994-95 (Aug. 6,
1986).
147. Id. at 1414
148. See id.; Wall St. J., Aug. 1, 1986, at 1.
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V. ENFORCING THE ACCORD
In agreeing to end semiconductor dumping in the United States,
Japan also agreed to stop LTFV sales in third countries. From the out-
set this pledge was seen as presenting a formidable enforcement prob-
lem. How was Japan to accomplish the required changes in semicon-
ductor purchasing by private industry in a free market, especially
transactions in the so called "grey market," third countries outside its
jurisdiction?
Before the agreement, 256K DRAMs sold for an average of
$2.25.1"9 In the month following the Accord, the price of 64K and
256K DRAMs produced in Japan increased 50 to 600 percent because
of new fair market values set by Commerce. 150 By October, based on
new statistics available to Commerce, the fair market value had
dropped considerably to the $2.00-5.00 range for 256K DRAMs. Nev-
ertheless, the price in third countries hovered around $2.00.151 The
higher prices for Japanese products provided an opportunity for Asian
and European competitors not bound by the agreement. For example,
while certain DRAMs were selling for $5 to $10 in Japan according to
Commerce's floor price, equivalent DRAMs produced in South Korea
cost less than $2.00.152
These high prices drove users not only to third country suppliers
such as Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea, but also created a
thriving "grey market" of unauthorized sales of Japanese semiconduc-
tors at less than the floor price.15 Only individual chips, not semicon-
ductors wired into circuit boards, were controlled under the Accord. As
a way to get around the increased prices, U.S. firms began to import
not the individual EPROMs and DRAMs but rather to import them
assembled into circuit boards. Upon receipt, the semiconductors could
be unplugged from "dummy" boards and then incorporated into func-
tional circuit boards in electronic equipment.'"
Because prices for sales within Japan were not covered by the
agreement, market prices for EPROMs and DRAMs remained very
low. The semiconductor manufacturers needed to get rid of huge inven-
tories of these components so that prices would begin to rise again. This
need to reduce inventory, along with a desire to maintain good cus-
149. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 1.
150. Id., Sept. 11, 1986, at 7.
151. Id., Nov. 24, 1986, at 6.
152. Id., Aug. 4, 1986, at 21.
153. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 6.
154. See JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 13, 1986, at 18.
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tomer relations and to maintain market share, led to widespread smug-
gling of low-cost semiconductors from Japan to third countries. 5 ' Gen-
erally, Japanese firms would sell semiconductors to brokers or private
exporters who either smuggled them out by suitcase or by means of
falsified prices on export licenses. In the third country, suppliers would
repackage the components and ship them to U.S. customers who paid
20 to 40 percent less than the prices set by Commerce under the
Accord.
As these types of sales obviously do not proceed through normal
channels, MITI had problems in monitoring circumvention of the floor
prices. Once the extent of the problem became clear, MITI instituted a
requirement that Japanese companies charge at least 90 percent of the
Commerce price for sales outside Japan.1 56 While it could do little to
control smuggling by suitcase, MITI moved to tighten export controls.
It significantly lowered the threshold value triggering the need for an
export license from 1 million yen (approximately $6850) to 50,000 yen
(approximately $342).151 It began to require MITI approval of the
price quoted on the license,'58 and extended the waiting period for a
license from two to three days to two to three weeks. 159 As a result,
MITI rapidly became buried in its own paperwork.
In spite of very creative efforts on the part of determined suppliers
and users, the Japanese government was able to exercise at least some
control over LTFV sales of semiconductors. At the same time it was
faced with the prospect of opening the Japanese market to foreign
products. A number of formidable obstacles stood in the way of enforc-
ing the market access portion of the Accord. First, the Japanese market
was glutted with its own semiconductors, making U.S. penetration of
the market more difficult. This overcapacity and oversupply carried
over into the U.S. market as well.' 60 In the United States, the demand
for computers and telecommunications equipment continued to be slug-
gish, maintaining the huge inventories of semiconductors.
Another major problem preventing an increase in U.S. market
share in Japan was that U.S. merchant firms specialize in making and
155. For extensive descriptions of the "grey market," see N.Y. Times, Mar. 25,
1987, at DI, col. 1; Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987 at 1.
156. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 1.
157. N.Y. Times, Apr. 7, 1987, at D9, col. 1.
158. Note that a determined grey market exporter could get around this require-
ment by selling at a price lower than the one specified on the export license. N.Y.
Times, Feb. 16, 1987, at 44, col. 1.
159. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 1.
160. Id.
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selling semiconductors for use in the automotive, telecommunications,
and computer industries. In Japan, however, similar fabricators are
part of vertically integrated companies which buy their electronic com-
ponents from different divisions of the same company.' 61 In Japan the
major customer buying from merchant-type operations is the consumer
electronics industry, which accounts for 40 percent of the Japanese de-
mand for semiconductors.' 62 In the United States there is very little
production of consumer electronics; consequently, U.S. firms do not
make the kinds of semiconductors in the quantities needed by Japanese
customers. Because of this disparity, it may be difficult to ever reach
the 20 percent market share in Japan that many in the U.S. industry
hoped to achieve by 1991.163
In the first year following the signing of the Accord, the market
share figures indicated either moderate improvement or nearly none,
depending upon which government supplied the statistics. According to
MITI's figures, by mid-1987 the U.S. market share in Japan had risen
from 8 percent to 11 or 12 percent. 64 On the other hand, the U.S. data
indicated a rise from an 8.4 percent share for April-September 1986 to
only 8.6 percent for January-March 1987.166
If little was happening for U.S. producers in the Japanese market,
Japanese companies selling in the U.S. market responded quickly to the
Accord. Because the Accord placed no controls on prices of semicon-
ductors made in the United States, many Japanese companies began to
buy into U.S. industry, negotiating joint ventures and technology li-
censing agreements and expanding their U.S. production facilities. 6 '
Japanese companies shifted their focus to selling semiconductors not
covered by the Accord, especially higher capacity memories such as the
1 megabyte DRAM, and challenging the U.S. lead in state-of-the-art
electronics such as application-specific integrated circuits ("ASIC"s)
and microprocessors.1 7 In perhaps the most bizarre twist, Intel, an
American company, announced that rather than increase its domestic
manufacturing capacity, it would now sell Mitsubishi EPROMs, made
in Japan, and Samsung DRAMs, made in Korea, under the Intel brand
161. JAPAN ECON. J., Dec. 13, 1986, at 15.
162. Id.
163. Another frequent complaint heard from Japanese buyers is that the U.S.
companies' commitment to customer service lags behind that of their Japanese counter-
parts. See id.; ELECTRONICS, Apr. 2, 1987 at 62-63, 65.
164. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 6.
165. JAPAN ECON. J., Aug. 1, 1987, at 5.
166. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1987, at 1.
167. Wall St. J., May 26, 1987, at 2.
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name."6 8 Ironically, Intel had been one of the original petitioners in the
EPROM dumping complaint.
VI. THE ACCORD AND GATT
Not surprisingly, the Accord, by virtue of carving up 80 percent of
the world production of semiconductors," 9 caused consternation among
semiconductor consumers outside the United States and Japan. In Oc-
tober 1986 the European Community requested a formal GATT con-
sultation on the legality of the Accord. 70 Semiconductor production in
the EC had been dropping rapidly, leaving the EC particularly vulnera-
ble to the drastic increase in prices brought about by the Accord.
171
While the most immediate effect was the price increase, the Accord,
conceived as a bilateral agreement outside the GATT framework, was
seen to weaken the GATT structure as a whole.
In the complaint 2 the EC alleged that MITI's control of export
prices by means of administrative guidance violated Article XI of
GATT, which prohibits quantitative restrictions on the import or ex-
port of goods. The agreement was seen as an attempt to circumvent the
GATT antidumping procedures and to exclude the EC from deciding
the dumping issue for itself; in other words, the United States and Ja-
pan presented their determination as fait accompli to the rest of the
world. In effect, the arrangement excluded the EC from the decision-
making process while forcing them to pay higher prices to assist U.S.
industries. Regarding market access, the EC complaint alleged that the
Accord, by improving market access for U.S. products, violated the
principle of most-favored-nation treatment required by GATT.
The panel's findings, issued in March 1988, were approved by the
GATT council in May 1988.173 The panel found that the monitoring of
export prices by the Japanese government, the creation of de facto floor
168. See N.Y. Times, July 30, 1987, at D4, col. 1.
169. See 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 347 (Mar. 11, 1987) (quoting Jean-Pierre
Derisbourg of the EC who described the semiconductor accord as "effectively giv[ing]
the two giants of the industry, with 80 percent of world production, the right to organ-
ize the world market as they wish").
170. For general descriptions of the EC complaint, see 3 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1244-45 (Oct. 15, 1986); New York Times, Nov. 21, 1986, at 33; 3 INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA) 1429 (Nov. 26, 1986). The EC was supported in its request for an
investigation by Hong Kong, Canada, Sweden, Singapore, Switzerland, Malaysia, and
Nigeria.
171. See 3 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1245 (Oct. 15, 1986) (EC must import two-
thirds of its requirements in 1985 with that percentage expected to increase).
172. See 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 452-54 (Mar. 30, 1988).
173. See Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, at 6, col. 2.
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prices by means of administrative guidance and third-country export
restrictions, constituted measures contrary to principles underlying Ar-
ticle XI:1." On the issue of market access, the panel found that those
provisions of the Accord did not violate the GATT because they did not
provide preferential treatment for U.S. products. 7 5 The panel sug-
gested that Japan change its rules regarding third-country sales to con-
form with GATT and that it should revise its rules for export licenses,
as MITI had been denying licenses which failed to meet threshold
prices set by administrative guidance. 178 The panel also took note of
Japan's promise to improve market access for semiconductors produced
by all GATT members.1 7
In response to the ruling, Japan stated that it would change its
procedures although it did not specify how it would go about this.178
Government and industry spokespersons in the United States indicated
their agreement with the findings, often with an air of detachment
which seemed to imply that the GATT findings somehow did not in-
volve the United States but rather was a matter between the EC and
Japan. The United States denied that the panel ruling undermined the
Accord itself. Rather, in its view the only aspect affected was how Ja-
pan had chosen to implement it. According to U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, Clayton Yeutter, "what we have been saying since the agreement
went into effect" was that some of the implementation methods were
not legal under GATT. 179 Yet it was the United States which pressured
the Japanese with the threat of sanctions to set up the export monitor-
ing scheme. Government and industry spokespersons, however, offered
no suggestions as to how Japan should go about this in spite of the fact
that Japan has very few legal or statutory ways to control exporters
except by administrative guidance. 8 '
VII. THE TRADE SANCTIONS OF 1987
Depending upon which party supplied the data, the U.S. market
share had either risen by more than one percent, dropped three percent,
or held steady in the year following the Accord.' 81 The dumping statis-
174. GATT Panel findings, paragraph 132A (from a restricted copy of GATT
proceedings).
175. Id., paragraph 132C.
176. Id., paragraph 132B.
177. Id., paragraph 132C.
178. Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1988, at 6.
179. 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 453 (Mar. 30, 1988).
180. Wall Street Journal, Mar. 8, 1988, at 12.
181. See 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 622 (May 6, 1987).
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tics were no less confusing, even with Commerce using MITI's own
data. For example, most American and Japanese semiconductor com-
panies calculate the cost of an item on the date of its shipment.' 82
Commerce, however, decided to calculate fair market value not at the
time of shipment but at six months prior to shipment. 83 In doing so,
the agency was introducing a pricing aberration into a sector character-
ized by rapidly falling prices with time; in other words, many inefficien-
cies can be worked out of a semiconductor manufacturing process over
a six-month time span so that identical products may have very differ-
ent costs of production."" In August 1988, the Commerce Department
responded to U.S. industry requests to alter its LTFV calculations. 8 5
By easing its formula for calculating dumping margins, Commerce
sought to encourage additional exports of semiconductors from Japan
to U.S. users.'88
With so little apparent progress on dumping and market access,
the United States began to pressure Japan by threatening to impose
trade sanctions or even to terminate the Accord if third country dump-
ing was not controlled. 87 To help raise prices and cut off supplies to
the grey market, in April 1987 MITI may have ordered a 30 percent
cutback in production to head off tariff sanctions.' Unfortunately, this
decision came just as an upturn in orders for computers began to drive
up U.S. semiconductor prices."' The production cuts, coupled with de-
lays in the export license process, created fears of shortages among
U.S. semiconductor users because U.S. manufacturers did not have the
increased production capacity to replace the Japanese sources.'9 "
182. See id. at 556 (Apr. 22, 1987).
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. 5 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1162 (Aug. 17, 1988). See also id. at 1178-79
(SIA requests and Commerce responses).
186. See id. at 1162.
187. See Wall St. J., Nov. 13, 1986, at 4; 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 312 (Mar.
4, 1987)(Japan given until the end of February 1987 to solve third-country dumping;
until the end of March 1987 to improve market access).
188. N.Y Times, Apr. 7, 1987, at 34. Both MITI and the U.S. government deny
this action took place. MITI would have an incentive to deny such an order because it
has been clear since the oil cartel dispute of the early 1980s that such orders would
violate Japan's Antimonopoly Law. Nevertheless, "administrative guidance" remains a
potent force in regulating the Japanese economy.
189. Wall St. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 2.
190. Japanese production of 256K DRAMs had been cut by 32% for April-June
1987 compared to October-December 1986. This cutback resulted in a supply shortage
as Japan controls 90% of the world market in 256K DRAMs. The impact was bigger
yet for 1 megabyte DRAMs where Japan's market share was even greater. See JAPAN
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Despite MITI's action, Washington moved forward with planning
trade sanctions. One option was to terminate the suspension agreements
covering EPROMs and DRAMs and to institute duties already as-
sessed by Commerce.1 91 This option would hurt U.S. semiconductor
users, however, because there was not enough domestic supply to make
up for Japanese semiconductors which would now carry higher prices.
A preferable option would be to increase tariffs on Japanese products
containing Japanese electronics or made by Japanese companies who
dump. 92 Another consideration in applying tariffs to imports is to
choose products which have U.S. competitors or to select those indus-
trial sectors where Japan enjoys little market share and wants to
expand.'
On March 31, 1987, Commerce released a list of $900 million
worth of Japanese products comprising the candidates for the ultimate
institution of $300 million in compensatory tariffs.' Of the figure of
$300 million in damages, $135 million was attributed to semiconductor
dumping since the Accord and $165 million to lost sales resulting from
lack of market access in Japan.'95 Two weeks later, 100 percent tariffs
were imposed on imports of laptop and desk top computers, 18-inch
and 20-inch color televisions, and power hand tools.' 96 The sanctions
ECoN. J., June 27, 1987, at 20.
191. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1987, at 21.
192. Id.
193. See id., Mar. 24, 1987, at 33.
194. 52 Fed. Reg. 10,275 (Mar. 31, 1987). This list included hard-disk drives;
computer central processing units; 18-inch and 19-inch color televisions; small color
televisions; black-and-white televisions; monochrome computer display terminals; com-
bination radio and tape players; combination phonograph and tape players; communi-
cations satellites and parts; small electric motors; computer tapes; window air-condi-
tioners; electric measuring devices, power hand tools; pumps and parts; refrigerators,
and commercial photographic film. In hearings before Commerce, computer makers
argued that it would be unwise to include computer components in the final sanctions
because U.S. manufacturers were already having to pay more for components and
semiconductors because of the Accord. 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 504 (Apr. 15,
1987). The representative from Makita power tools argued that imposing tariffs on
imported power hand tools would cause workforce cutbacks at Makita's U.S. manufac-
turing plants. Id. at 505.
195. Id.
196. 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 537 (Apr. 22, 1987). In 1986, $600 million
worth of Japanese laptop and desktop computers were sold in the United States. In the
same year approximately one million 18- and 20-inch color televisions were imported.
By imposing 100% tariffs, the Administration estimated that there would be $180 mil-
lion in lost sales of computers, $190 million in lost sales of televisions, and $30 million
in lost sales of power hand tools, yielding the total of $300 million sought by the sanc-
tions. Id.
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were taken under the authority granted to the President by section 301
to impose duties as a way of enforcing U.S. rights under a trade
agreement.97
The Japanese reaction was swift. Even before the final list of tariff
targets was announced, Japan warned it would appeal any tariff sanc-
tion to GATT.'"8 It followed through on this threat by bringing an Ar-
ticle XXIII(1) complaint under the GATT dispute settlement provi-
sion. 99 According to Article XXIII, the parties must have bilateral
talks in an attempt to settle the dispute before the agreement may be
suspended or tariffs instituted. °0 Failing that, one or both sides may
request that a GATT panel be appointed to adjudicate the dispute.20'
Meanwhile in the United States, nearly as soon as the sanctions
were announced, speculation began over how long the tariffs would last.
Within six weeks after the sanctions began, President Reagan an-
nounced his intention to lift the 100 percent tariff on 20-inch color tele-
visions.20 2 Commerce statistics indicated that Japanese DRAMs had
increased to within 85 percent of fair market value. This rise had elimi-
nated the unfair trading advantage by $51 million, equal to the value
of their exports of 20-inch sets.' 3 Nevertheless, there was strong oppo-
sition in Congress to the Reagan Administration's decision to reward
Japan for partial compliance with the Accord.20 4
The SIA also urged the continuance of sanctions, but for different
reasons. The SIA wanted sanctions continued until the Japanese gov-
ernment agreed to remove floor prices and to end production limits.20 5
Of course, the floor prices originally were instituted to meet fair market
value calculations of the U.S. government. The production limits were
instituted to get rid of huge inventories of less than fair market value
semiconductors glutting the Japanese market as a way of improving
access for U.S. products. Apparently, in the SIA's opinion the cure had
become worse than the disease.
Sanctions were again eased in November 1987. According to
Commerce evaluations, by that time all dumping of EPROMs and
197. See 52 Fed. Reg. 10,275 (Mar. 31, 1987).
198. See 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 505 (Apr. 15, 1987).
199. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Art. XXIII(1) October 30,
1947, 61 Stat (5) A5, A64-65, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188.
200. Id.
201. Id., Art. XXIII (2).
202. See 4 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 754 (June 10, 1987).
203. Id.
204. See id. at 796-97 (June 17, 1987).
205. See id. at 1115 (Sept. 16, 1987); id. at 1142 (Sept. 23, 1987).
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DRAMs in the United States and in third countries had ceased. Fur-
ther, shortages of semiconductors were due not to any official restric-
tions on supply but rather to growing demand exceeding available pro-
duction. 0 Thus, President Reagan suspended the remaining $84
million in tariffs imposed for dumping violations, leaving intact the re-
maining $165 million imposed for lack of market access. 07 The market
access sanctions remain in effect. 08
VIII. THE FAILURE TO LEARN FROM THE PAST
What have been the major effects of the Accord thus far? The
higher prices for semiconductors have benefited U.S. producers, but
Japanese producers benefited as well from production cutbacks which
drove up prices and increased profits.2"9 Additionally, the floor prices
brought an end to the intense price war among Japanese companies
which had severely cut into profits.2 10 Yet even with increased prices,
U.S. companies did not increase production capacity. Without in-
creased capacity, especially in semiconductors for consumer electronics,
it seemed unlikely that U.S. producers would be able to make signifi-
cant gains in market share in Japan. Indeed, with the upturn in de-
mand, especially from the domestic computer industry, U.S. producers
seemed more interested in selling to their U.S. customers than in ex-
panding into Japan.21" '
The semiconductor agreement stimulated Japanese firms to shift
their production to facilities within the United States, where the prices
were not controlled.212 If these facilities were able to achieve the same
level of productivity as they experienced in Japan, their greater effi-
ciency would allow them to out-produce U.S. manufacturers, and thus
drive down prices.21 3
206. See id. at 1348 (Nov. 4, 1987).
207. See id. at 1382 (Nov. 11, 1987).
208. See 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 145-46 (Feb. 1, 1989) (Senator Domenici
urging President Bush to retain sanctions).
209. JAPAN ECON. J., May 8, 1987, at 10.
210. Wall St. J., Nov. 6, 1987, at 1.
211. Id. On the other hand, there are a number of companies who have increased
their market share in Japan, even succeeding in supplying chips to Japanese
automakers who had been viewed as "notorious holdouts" against buying American.
See Yoder, U.S. Chips are Quietly Cracking the Japanese Market, Wall St. J., Mar.
22, 1989 at B-4.
212. See supra text accompanying note 166.
213. NEC expanded its 256K DRAM production in the United States. In Japan
NEC is able to produce 20-30 percent higher yields than most U.S. manufacturers.
Thus NEC would be able to provide DRAMs at lower prices, essentially defeating U.S.
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The United States has experience beyond the semiconductor
agreement in managing the consequences of restricting entry of Japa-
nese products into the American market. Previous attempts have in-
cluded import restrictions on Japanese automobiles and steel. These ac-
tions were not brought because Japanese producers were selling autos
and steel at less than fair market value in violation of U.S. antidump-
ing laws. Rather, under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974,214 U.S.
industries and their employees may obtain temporary relief from inju-
ries brought about by increased, fairly traded imports, thus providing
industries some breathing space to adjust to the changed circum-
stances. Under section 201 the President is given the authority to im-
pose duties or to withdraw or modify trade concessions when the do-
mestic industry suffers or is threatened with serious injury caused by
increased imports.211 So, unlike many other provisions of U.S. trade
law, section 201 provides relief from fair, rather than unfair, trade
practices.
The ITC conducts section 201 investigations. The investigation
may be initiated by petition of "an entity, including a trade association,
firm, . . . union, or group of workers, which is representative of an
industry. ' 12 1 ' Additionally, the President, the U.S.T.R., the House
Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Finance Committee, or the
ITC on its own motion may initiate a section 201 investigation. 1 7
The ITC must determine whether or not increased imports of a
product into the United States are a substantial cause of or pose a
threat of serious injury to the domestic industry that produces a like or
directly competitive product.218 The ITC considers a variety of factors
in its investigation, including whether there is a "significant idling of
productive facilities in the industry, the inability of a significant num-
ber of firms to operate at a reasonable level of profit and significant
unemployment or underemployment within the industry. '21 9 The ITC
also looks for declining sales, growing inventory, and downward trends
producers in their own backyard. Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1986, at 6.
214. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253, as amended by §§ 248-249 of the Trade and Tariff
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473.
215. The President may raise duties, establish import quotas, and negotiate or-
derly marketing agreements with foreign exporting countries. See 19 U.S.C. § 2251
(1982).
216. Id. § 2251(a)(1).
217. Id. § 2251(b).
218. See id. § 2251(b)(1). The ITC also must define the domestic industry and
what articles of foreign origin are competing directly with the domestically produced
articles. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(3).
219. Id. § 2251(b)(2)(A).
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in production, profits, wages or employment in the domestic industry.22
Most of this information is gathered from questionnaires to importers,
U.S. industry and from a mandatory public hearing.22 Thus, the fact-
finding portion of a section 201 investigation is very similar to an an-
tidumping investigation.
For relief to be granted under section 201, the ITC must find that
increased imports have caused "serious injury" to the domestic indus-
try.222 This "serious injury" test is more stringent than the "material
injury" test embodied in the antidumping statutes.2 3 Under those stat-
utes there need only be some material injury to the domestic industry
caused by unfair trade practices, even though there may be other fac-
tors which have caused greater harm.2 In contrast, section 201 re-
quires a greater showing of harm as it deals with fair trade practices on
the part of the exporting countries; increased imports must be the sub-
stantial cause of serious injury to the domestic industry,223 a standard
which is often difficult to meet.
If the ITC finds that the domestic industry is threatened by or is
suffering from a serious injury due to increased imports, its affirmative
decision is sent to the President.226 In its report the ITC must recom-
mend the form of relief to be granted to the industry.227 This relief can
take the form of increased duties, import restrictions, or adjustment
assistance to the affected industry. 28 If the ITC makes a negative de-
termination or recommends only the provision of adjustment assistance
to the affected industry, the President has no discretion to alter the
ITC's recommendation. 229 Alternatively, the President may establish
quotas or tariff-rate quotas, increase duties up to 50 percent, negotiate
orderly marketing agreements, provide adjustment assistance, or decide
to provide no relief at all.230
The variety of policy choices available to the President is an out-
growth of the fact that the section 201 import restrictions must be ap-
plied across the board to all exporting countries regardless of whether
220. See id. § 2251(b)(2)(B).
221. Id. § 2251(c).
222. Id. § 2251(b)(1).
223. See id. §§ 1303, 1671.
224. Id. § 2251(b)(2)(D).
225. Substantial cause is defined as "a cause which is important and not less than
any other cause." Id. § 2251(b)(4).
226. Id. § 2251(d).
227. Id. § 2251(d)(I).
228. Id. § 2251(d).
229. Id. § 2252.
230. See id. § 2253(a).
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the countries have increased their exports of the product to the United
States.2 31 Although the President retains the option to pursue selective
orderly marketing agreements with individual exporting countries, this
remaining form of relief can trigger the suspension of substantially
equal trade concessions by other exporting countries under Article XIX
of the GATT. In response to this possibility, section 201 requires the
President to consider a number of domestic and international economic
factors in choosing the form of relief for the domestic industry. 2S
Regardless of the form of relief chosen, it may be granted for a
period not to exceed five years.2 3 The temporary nature of the relief is
seen as a way of encouraging adjustment by the industry to increased
competition. The relief must be phased down during the final three
years, although the President may reduce or terminate the relief if it is
in the national interest to do so. '
In keeping with its pro-free trade stance, the Reagan Administra-
tion generally was hostile to the filing of section 201 cases. However, it
must be recalled that the Administration had to balance free trade
against the devastating impact of the 1981-1983 recession on U.S. in-
dustrial output.
A. Automobiles
The late 1970s saw a significant increase in the market share of
imported automobiles sold in the United States.2 5 From 1978 to 1981
retail sales of Japanese autos rose from 11.9 percent of the market to
22.0 percent.2 36 This increase in market share led the Ford Motor
Company and the United Auto Workers Union to file a joint petition
for import relief under section 201. According to the petition, the U.S.
auto industry was being seriously injured by foreign car imports, espe-
cially those from Japan.237
231. Id. § 2253.
232. See 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c). Other factors the President must consider include
the likelihood of adjustment assistance for workers and firms, efforts being made by the
industry to improve competitiveness, the effect of import relief on consumers, and the
economic and social costs absent relief.
233. See supra note 18. The President may extend the relief for a further three
years at no higher level than existed at the end of the five-year term.
234. Id. § 2253(h)(3).
235. For an extensive discussion of the status of the U.S. auto industry, see U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm'n, The Internationalization of the Automobile Industry and its Ef-
fects on the U.S. Automobile Industry, U.S.I.T.C. publ. no. 1712 (1985) [hereinafter
"Auto Report"].
236. Id. at 8.
237. See Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, 2
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Late in 1980, the ITC held by a 3-2 margin that increased imports
of passenger vehicles were not a substantial cause of injury to the in-
dustry.238 Rather, the ITC found the domestic economic recession to be
more significant than any other factor in causing injury to the domestic
industry. 3 9 The majority characterized the loss of market share as be-
ing a symptom of the general downturn in the economy resulting in a
decline in demand. 40 Rather than analyze factors such as higher gaso-
line prices, reduced income of the unemployed, and higher interest
rates separately, the ITC grouped them into one overriding factor: de-
cline in demand.24' Although the ITC recognized that increased im-
ports were an important cause of injury to the U.S. auto industry, it
found that imports did not qualify, under the strict criteria of section
201, as the "substantial cause." 242
The majority also recognized that while Japanese automakers had
been able to capitalize early on the shift in consumer preference for
smaller vehicles, American producers were making progress in adapting
product lines to meet this need.2 43 Therefore, it refused to provide sec-
tion 201 relief because it found that increased imports did not pose a
substantial threat to the domestic industry. 44 The majority expected
that the recovery from the recession would restore the industry and
thereby obviate any need for interim import remedies. 4
The majority recognized that this interpretation of section 201's
causation criteria with regard to relief during a recession could meet
strong opposition. Chairman Alberger described the decision as being
in "an area of legal policy that is by its very nature controversial and
subjective. 2 46 Shortly thereafter, legislation was introduced in Con-
gress to restrict Japanese car imports. 7 President Reagan stated that
he would be hard-pressed to veto such a bill.2 48 Thus, despite the ITC's
negative determination, the President announced that the administra-
tion would negotiate directly with Japan to establish a voluntary re-
INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 5241-5301, 5260 (1982).
238. Id. at 5243 (views of Chairman Alberger).
239. Id. at 5249-52.
240. Id. at 5250-51.
241. See id. at 5271-73 (views of Vice Chairman Calhoun).
242. See id. at 5254-55 (views of Chairman Alberger).
243. See id. at 5252-54 (views of Chairman Alberger).
244. Id. at 5243.
245. See id. at 5249-55 (views of Chairman Alberger).
246. See id. at 5254.
247. See Seaberry, Japan Links Auto Cut to Concessions, Wash. Post, Apr. 18,
1981.
248. Id.
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straint agreement on auto imports.249
Ignoring the objection of Japanese automakers, MITI announced
that it would adhere to a voluntary restraint agreement on auto exports
to the United States.260 The Japanese agreed to limit exports to 1.68
million units for 1981, a restraint level which ultimately was in effect
through March 1984.251 The voluntary export limit increased to 1.85
million for the 1984-1985 model year. Finally in March 1985, Presi-
dent Reagan announced his intention not to renew the voluntary re-
straint agreement because administration officials felt that the domestic
industry had recovered its competitive ability against the Japanese. 252
Although the agreement was terminated, the Japanese government uni-
laterally has limited exports to 2.3 million autos per year since that
time.263
What was accomplished by proceeding with a voluntary restraint
agreement when the ITC had determined that no import relief was nec-
essary? In the absence of a restraint agreement, certainly there would
have been greater sales of Japanese cars and a corresponding reduction
in domestic sales. Yet even with the agreement in place, the Japanese
automakers increased their market share from 17 percent before 1981
to 21 percent by 1983.254 Although demand for small Japanese cars
climbed steeply during the oil price increase during the late 1970s, the
249. See 71 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) A-16 (April 1, 1981). By pursuing vol-
untary restraints the Administration indicated a willingness to go around the proce-
dural safeguards of section 201. Indeed, one Japanese commentator described the pur-
suit of voluntary restraints as a "game without ground rules." 76 U.S. IMPORT WKLY.
(BNA) A-3 (May 3, 1981) (quoting former Japanese Ambassador to the United States
Nobuhiko Ushiba).
250. Announcement reprinted in 76 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) N-I (May 6,
1981).
251. See Auto Report, supra note 235, at 64.
252. See Auto Report, supra note 235, at 10.
253. See 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 62 (Jan.l, 1989) (restrictions in force for
ninth consecutive year). For the 1985-86 and 1986-87 model years, this decision
amounted to a 24 percent increase, yet it was less than it might have been had the
Japanese automakers been given free rein. See also 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 476
(April 3, 1985). White House spokesman Larry Speakes referred to the new limit as in
reality not any restraint at all. Congress also was upset by the apparent surge in im-
ports. Id. Indeed Prime Minister Nakasone admitted that it might have been better to
have informally observed the rate of Japanese exports over a period of time rather than
to have announced numerical limits at the outset. See id. at 540 (Apr. 17, 1985). Japa-
nese automakers also fought bitterly among themselves for shares of the new export
quota. See Lehner, Japanese Auto Concerns Are Fighting Over How Many Cars to
Ship to the U.S., Wall St. J., Mar 21, 1985, at 17. See also Wall St. J., Feb. 13, 1986,
at 3 (decision to renew restrictions for 1986-87 model year).
254. See H.R. Export Task Force, The Year in Trade - 1983, at 11 (1984).
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subsequent decline in oil prices should have led to a decline in con-
sumer preference for smaller autos. Additionally, the introduction of
smaller American-made cars during the term of the restraint agree-
ment should have enhanced competition for more of this segment of the
market.2 5 The ITC staff concluded that without the restraint Japanese
cars would have captured approximately 28 percent of the market in
1984.256
Consumer prices for cars also increased during the term of the
restraint agreement. This increase was due in part to a growing prefer-
ence for larger cars as a result of declining oil prices and a tendency for
Japanese automakers to export larger cars, which support a higher
profit margin, to the American market. 5 During this period of time
the dollar strengthened on the international market; consequently any
gains in auto industry employment probably were offset by losses in
employment by exporting industries. 58
Thus, while the voluntary restraint agreement helped profits, em-
ployment, investment, and productivity to increase in the United
States, Japanese plants still remained twice as productive as American
plants in 1984.29 Japanese automakers also opened plants in the
United States as a way of avoiding import restrictions.260 They also
began to move away from the production of small cars toward mid-size
models which compete more directly with U.S. products. 61 It appears
that the only positive aspect of the agreement was to allow the U.S.
automakers some breathing space in which they could improve their
production facilities and investments.262 According to then Acting
U.S.T.R. Michael Smith, the estimated economic costs of the restraints
to U.S. consumers were modest until 1983 when the economy began to
recover strongly. 6 3 This statement implies that the recession was in-
deed the problem as the ITC had stated rather than competition from
Japanese imported automobiles.
255. See Auto Report, supra note 235, at 64.
256. See id. According to the staff report, demand for Japanese cars would have
remained low during the recession but would have increased as the economy recovered.
257. See id. at 65-67. The average price for Japanese cars increased 39% over the
course of the restraint agreement, from $6,709 in 1980 to $9,300 in 1984.
258. See id. at 70-71.
259. See H.R. Export Task Force, The Year in Trade - 1983 at 36 (1985).
260. 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 840 (June 26, 1985).
261. Id. at 840-41 (quoting statement of auto analyst Maryann Keller before the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee).
262. See id. at 841 (statement of then Acting U.S. Trade Representative Michael
Smith).
263. Id.
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B. Steel
Despite the strengthening economy and post-recessionary improve-
ments in other manufacturing sectors, the U.S. steel industry was still
suffering huge losses, layoffs, and plant closings in 1983.64 Steel im-
ports into the U.S. market had risen from two percent in the 1950s to a
record high of 22 percent by 1983, a 1100 percent increase in market
share.26 Naturally, the domestic industry viewed these increased im-
ports as the source of many of its problems. Unlike other sectors of the
steel industry, U.S. specialty steel firms are export-oriented, generally
more efficient, and have modern facilities.2 6 Their products sell for
much higher prices than ordinary steel and the specialty steel produc-
ers tend to enjoy higher profits than the domestic industry as a whole
and individual foreign competitors. " ' Despite this circumstance, per-
ceived subsidization of foreign steel producers led U.S. specialty steel
interests to file two petitions for relief from imported steel.
Because these petitions alleged unfair trade practices in the form
of subsidies by foreign governments, they were filed originally under
section 301.1118 ITC investigation indicated that the scope of the inquiry
should be broadened to include not only the alleged offending countries
named in the petitions but also specialty steel producers throughout the
world.2 69 To increase the scope of the investigations, both cases were
altered to include section 201 proceedings.2 70
The first case involving Japan originally began as a complaint
against specialty steel producers in Austria, Brazil, and Sweden, and
four member countries of the European Community ("EC"): Belgium,
France, Italy, and the United Kingdom.2 71 Following the filing of the
then section 301 petition on December 2, 1981, the U.S.T.R.'s office
initiated an investigation into subsidy practices in these countries.2 72
264. U.S. steel plants lost $3.2 billion in 1982 and $2 billion in 1983. See H.R.
EXPORT TASK FORCE, The Year in Trade - 1983, supra note 254, at 8.
265. See id. Steel imports rose from 2% in the 1950s, to 10% in the 1960s, to
15% through most of the 1970s. Id.
266. See President's Section 301 Determination on Specialty Steel, reprinted in 7
U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 239 (Nov.17, 1982).
267. See id. For detailed description of the plight of the industry, see U.S, IMPORT
WKLY. (BNA) at 637-38 (Feb. 16, 1983).
268. 5 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1414 (1984).
269. See 47 Fed Reg. 10,107 and 36,387 (1982).
270. See 47 Fed. Reg. 51,717 (1982).
271. 5 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1414 (1984).
272. The investigation did not begin until March, 1982. See U.S. IMPORT WKLY.
(BNA) 503 (Mar. 3, 1982).
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After a lengthy investigation, the U.S. Trade Representative recom-
mended that the President request the ITC to conduct an expedited
section 201 investigation into specialty steel imports.27" Recognizing
that Presidential action could not control the potential suppliers not
named in the petition, President Reagan followed this recommendation
and the section 201 investigation began in December 1982.274
During the following March the ITC made affirmative determina-
tions of injury in four segments of the specialty steel industry. 27 The
ITC found that the decline in production and capacity utilization, the
decline in wages, and the sustained operating losses of these producers
indicated that each was seriously injured.276 In finding that increased
imports were the substantial cause of serious injury to the domestic
industry, the ITC relied on the fact that there had been a decline in the
domestic demand corresponding to sales lost to imports.277
To remedy the effects of increased imports, the ITC recommended
that the President institute quotas on foreign specialty steel for three
years.278 In a compromise with industry forces, President Reagan
awarded the specialty steel producers four years of import relief so that
they might complete investment projects and improve profitability.27 9
This relief took the form of quotas on bar, rod, and alloy tool steel, and
digressive tariffs on stainless sheet, strip, and plate.280 The President
273. The U.S.T.R. also recommended that the President begin negotiations to re-
duce the problem of imports and begin monitoring European imports for possible action
under § 301. See 7 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 215 (Nov. 17, 1982).
274. For the text of President Reagan's recommendation, see supra note 266.
275. The Commission determined that producers of stainless steel strip and sheet,
stainless steel plate, stainless steel bar and rod, and alloy tool steel were injured by
increased imports. See Stainless Steel and Alloy Tool Steel, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec.
(BNA) 1412 (1984).
276. For a description of the losses incurred by each of the four industry seg-
ments, see id. at 1419-21.
277. See id. at 1422-24.
278. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1426-32 (1984). The Commission rec-
ommended an 8% quota for sheet and strip, a 10% quota for plate, a 17% quota for
bars, a 42% quota for rods, and a 20% quota for alloy tool steel.
279. Domestic industry representatives had requested even lower quotas to extend
for a five-year period. See 8 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 158 (May 4, 1983); id. at
254-55 (May 18, 1983). Some senators also pressured the President to decrease quotas
and extend the length of relief to the maximum of five years. See id. at 455 (June 22,
1983).
280. See President's memorandum on specialty steel import relief, reprinted, 8
U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 551-52 (July 6, 1983). The President followed the quotas
recommended by the ITC with a provision for a 3% increase per annum in the quota
limits.
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also directed the U.S.T.R. to begin negotiations of orderly marketing
agreements for rod, bar, and alloy tool steel with any country who
wished to participate. 81
The President's decision was poorly received by both the European
producers targeted by the original complaint and Japanese produc-
ers.282 The EC and the Japanese government announced their intention
to seek compensation under GATT Article XIX to offset the losses due
to U.S. import restrictions. 88 After negotiations failed to resolve the
dispute, the EC imposed tariffs and instituted quotas for imports of
U.S. chemicals, plastics, alarm devices, and sporting goods.2 84 The U.S.
and Japan negotiated an orderly marketing agreement to cover spe-
cialty steel products.2 5
The second case affecting Japanese steel imports also began as a
section 301 unfair trade practice petition. In December 1982, a coali-
tion of U.S. steel producers filed a complaint which charged that Japan
and the European Community had violated the GATT by agreeing to
impose minimum prices and/or quotas for Japanese steel shipped to the
EC. 286 According to the petition, these arrangements violated most-fa-
vored-nation obligations of Japan toward the United States and other
bilateral treaty provisions. 287 The producers were seeking relief in the
form of import quotas, import surcharges, enforcement of Japan's obli-
281. Id.
282. See id. at 658-59 (July 27, 1985) (response of European Community); JAPAN
INST. FOR SOCIAL AND ECON. AFFAIRS, KEIZAI KOHO CENTER BRIEF No. 10 (Aug.
1983) (response of Japan Iron and Steel Foundation).
283. See 8 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 683-84 (Aug. 3, 1983) (European Com-
munity); id. at 778 (Aug. 17, 1983) (Japan).
284. See H.R. Export Task Force, The Year in Trade - 1984 10 (1985).
285. See 9 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 9 (Oct. 19, 1983).
Although this case was conducted as a section 201 proceeding, that is, investigat-
ing increased imports resulting from fair trade practices, it contained a heavy dose of
the rhetoric of unfair trade. For example, during a news conference following President
Reagan's decision, U.S. Trade Representative William Brock stated, "I think hopefully
we have used a sufficient two-by-four this time to indicate that we just can't continue to
tolerate a world system that is totally trade distortive, where governments intervene at
will without any consideration of international rule." Quoted in Cunningham et al.,
Relief from Imports under Section 201 ("The Escape Clause") and Section 406 of the
Trade Act of 1974 at 180, in THE TRADE AGREEMENT ACT OF 1979 - FOUR YEARS
LATER (Practicing L. Inst. Handbook No. 425, 1983). Some commentators have sug-
gested that both the President and the Commission realized that much of the requested
relief had already been supplied under previous quota regimes. Nevertheless the Ad-
ministration viewed this case as an opportunity to change long-term behavior of the
exporting countries. See id. at 163, 179-81.
286. See 7 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 401-02 (Dec. 22, 1982).
287. Id.
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gations to the United States, and an end to the EC-Japan
agreements. 88
In response, Japan pointed out that its exports to the U.S. had
fallen by 30 percent during 1982.289 Simultaneously, however, Japan
was planning to renew its agreement to limit shipments to the EC, the
practice which the American producers had cited as creating an influx
of steel on the American market.2 90 In its rebuttal before the Commis-
sion, Japanese spokespersons analogized the EC agreement to voluntary
restraint agreements used by the United States.2 91 Additionally, they
denied that government control over valuation of the yen had been used
to subsidize the industry.2 92
The U.S. producers conditionally withdrew their section 301 peti-
tion when it was announced that the United States would pursue nego-
tiations with the Japanese to resolve the problem.2 93 These negotiations
resulted in an agreement to hold consultations to maintain "un-
restricted and free" bilateral steel trade.2 94 This outcome did not satisfy
the domestic steel producers who reopened their section 301 complaint.
When the U.S.T.R. rejected the industry's petition as failing to show
any impact on U.S. domestic steel, producers turned to Congress for
relief.2 95
As impetus for steel legislation grew in Congress, the news that
steel imports had reached a two-year high led Bethlehem Steel and the
United Steelworkers of America to file a section 201 petition in early
1984 for relief from increased imports of foreign carbon and alloy steel
products.296 They filed their complaint under section 201 so that all
potential steel suppliers could be considered in the investigation. The
petitioners requested that the administration limit imports of these
products to no more than 15 percent of domestic demand for a five-
year period.2 97
In hearings before the ITC, the petitioners argued that increased
288. Id.
289. Id. at 484 (Jan. 19, 1983).
290. Id. at 485.
291. Id. at 525-26 (Jan. 26, 1983) (statement of the Japan Iron & Steel Export-
ers' Ass'n).
292. Id. at 526.
293. Id. at 560 (Feb. 2, 1983).
294. Id. at 635 (Feb. 16, 1983).
295. Id. at 679-80 (Mar. 2, 1983). The House Steel Caucus proposed a bill which
would limit imports to 15 % of the domestic market. See 9 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA)
568 (Jan. 25, 1984).
296. See 9 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 568 (Jan. 25, 1984).
297. Id.
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imports had prevented the industry from completing its modernization
program and had forced the layoff of thousands of steelworkers.2 98 On
the other hand, steel importers attributed the problem to a decline in
domestic demand, high wages, the strong dollar, and obsolete plants.2 99
Even some domestic producers opposed the filing of the petition on the
basis of its potential to undermine an existing formal agreement be-
tween the U.S. and the EC and the informal import arrangement with
Japan. a00
By a 3-2 majority, the ITC made affirmative determinations of in-
jury with reference to a number of steel industry sectors.30 1 It recom-
mended that the President institute a mixture of tariffs, tariff-rate quo-
tas, and quotas for a period of five years to give the domestic steel
industry the opportunity to adjust to increased imports. 2
The Reagan Administration faced choices between the interests of
domestic producers and consumers, as well as between political inter-
ests at home and our allies abroad. President Reagan did not follow
any of the ITC recommendations. Instead he directed the U.S.T.R. to
negotiate voluntary restraint agreements with countries responsible for
increased imports and to reaffirm agreements previously made with the
EC and Japan.30 3 His decision to pursue restraint agreements ran
298. Id. at 990 (May 16, 1984).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 568 (Jan. 25, 1984). The Federal Trade Commission estimated that
consumers would have to pay $768 million more per year if the ITC imposed import
relief. The ITC recommended the provision of adjustment assistance or tariffs instead
of quotas. See id. at 990-91 (May 16, 1984).
301. See Carbon and Certain Alloy Steel Products, U.S.I.T.C. Publ. no. 1553
(July, 1984) [hereinafter "Steel 1984"].
302. The ITC recommended tariff-rate quotas for ingots, blooms, billets, slabs and
sheet bars; it recommended quotas on plates, hot-rolled and cold-rolled sheets and
strips, galvanized sheets and strips, all other further worked sheets and strips, struc-
tural shapes and units, wire, and wire products. It also recommended a tariff on wire
products. In all cases the tariffs and quotas were to be held stable during the first three
years of the relief period. All tariff components would be decreased during the last two
years. All other quotas would be increased during these final two years of relief. See
Steel 1984, supra note 301, at 2-3, 72.
Although the majority considered declining demand, intra-industry competition,
and discretionary decisions (such as labor contracts, raw materials sourcing) as factors
contributing to the injury of the domestic producers, the Commission did not cumulate
these factors to be weighed against the injury due to imports. Rather they based their
finding on the observation that imports were no less an important cause of injury than
any of the other factors. See e.g., id. at 60-61 (injury to sheet and strip producers).
303. See White House statement on steel import relief decision, reprinted in 1
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 330-31 (Sept. 19, 1984). The U.S.T.R. also was directed to
negotiate surge controls and to consult with U.S. trading partners to eliminate imbal-
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counter to an earlier expressed sentiment against negotiating a volun-
tary restraint agreement with Japan.30 4 Following several months of ne-
gotiations, the Administration concluded voluntary agreements with
seven countries, including Japan. °5 However, several more months
passed before the U.S. and Japan were able to agree on the details of
the proposal.306
Commentators decried these new agreements as simply forestalling
the necessary adjustment which the U.S. steel industry will have to
undergo to become competitive in the world market.30 7 Others, includ-
ing the Federal Trade Commission, have predicted that consumers will
bear added costs because of higher prices and transfer of production
offshore.308
Government protection for the U.S. steel and automotive indus-
tries has done little to reverse their drop in market share. Indeed, the
voluntary export restraints on automobiles cost American consumers
nearly $18 billion in higher prices. 30 9 Although the stated purpose of
the VRA was to allow American automakers with low production rates
an opportunity to become more competitive, General Motors used the
four years to diversify out of the auto industry by investing in one Ko-
rean and two Japanese auto firms, abandoning its plans for developing
its own small car, forming a joint venture with Toyota, and purchasing
Hughes Aircraft and Electronic Data Systems.310 Fortunately, the five-
year Steel Import Stabilization Act of 1984 is an improvement over the
auto VRA in that it requires the President to annually affirm that the
industry is taking measures to improve its competitiveness. 1' However,
despite restructuring, shipments of the two most important commodi-
ances in trade. See id. at 331.
304. See 8 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 731 (Aug. 10, 1983).
305. See 2 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 5 (Jan. 2, 1985). The other six countries
concluding agreements were Korea (1.9%); Brazil (0.8%); Mexico (0.3%); Spain
(0.67%); Australia (0.18%); and South Africa (0.42%).
306. See id. at 705 (May 22, 1985). The Japanese agreed to limit exports of six
classes of steel for five years.
307. See id. at 261 (Feb. 20, 1985) (statement of Fred Lamesch, president of the
American Inst. for Imported Steel); Pine, Steel Import Quotas: Try Now, Pay Later,
Wall Street J., June 17, 1985, at 1.
308. See 9 U.S. IMPORT WKLY. (BNA) 990-91 (May 16, 1984) (FTC estimates
of $768 million per year increase in consumer costs).
309. COLLYNS & DUNAWAY, THE COST OF TRADE RESTRAINTS: THE CASE OF
JAPANESE AUTOMOBILE EXPORTS TO THE UNITED STATES 150 (Int'l Monetary Fund
Staff Papers, Mar. 1987).
310. See Wall St. J., Sept .25, 1985, at 30; Fortune, July 8, 1985, at 22.
311. See Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, § 806(b), 98 Stat.
3046 (1984).
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ties, carbon and specialty steel, have declined, as have profits and em-
ployment. 312 President Bush has extended protection for the steel indus-
try through March 1992.13
The Semiconductor Accord also may diminish the usefulness of
VRAs in the future. Although the GATT ruling on the EC complaint
may be limited in its overall effect on the Accord, it may not bode well
for attempts to construct voluntary restraint agreements in the future.
Both the United States and the EC have pursued VRAs with Japan to
cover a variety of commodities. In the past, enforcement of these agree-
ments has relied heavily on MITI's administrative guidance mecha-
nism. Following the ruling in the EC complaint, administrative guid-
ance may be foreclosed for enforcement and future VRAs may be
vulnerable to challenges before the GATT council by third countries
harmed by export restrictions and pricing arrangements.
On the other hand, the EC recently began its own negotiations
with Japan to reach an agreement similar to the Semiconductor Ac-
cord.314 Reportedly the pact would set uniform floor prices for exports
from all Japanese suppliers, although it will not include reciprocal mar-
ket access provisions as found in the U.S.-Japan accord.31 5 The EC-
Japan pact, which also refrains from imposing third-country controls,
thus may withstand scrutiny by GATT, unlike the earlier Accord.3 18
IX. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ACCORD
An examination of the record accumulated since the Accord went
into effect indicates that the results are mixed at best. While the
United States should never abandon its right to pursue those who vio-
late the antidumping laws, it remains unclear in this instance whether
LTFV semiconductor sales were cured by the Accord and the subse-
quent imposition of tariff sanctions or by the worldwide upturn in
demand.
Although the Accord was not a major stimulus for the changes
embodied in the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,"'
changes in section 201 and section 301 will affect future approaches to
correct problems in semiconductor trade. Amendments to section 203
312. See Dallmeyer, supra note 1, at 50.
313. See 6 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1146 (Sept. 13, 1989) (also calling for steel
producing nations to reach consensus on ending steel subsidies).
314. See JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 4, 1987, at 1.
315. See id., at 4.
316. Id.
317. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. I, Aug. 3, 1988.
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formally incorporate negotiation of international agreements as a statu-
tory option available to the President. 8 " Adjustment assistance now
may extend for eight years,81 9 instead of just five, on the condition that
industry make positive adjustments to foreign competition.320 Section
202 now holds the opportunity for provisional relief in "critical circum-
stances,13 21 i.e., when there is a substantial increase in imports over a
relatively short period of time.32 2 Thus, interim relief may be granted
in the form of new or increased duties pending the outcome of the in-
vestigation. 33 Given the volatility of the semiconductor industry, sec-
tion 202 may become a popular avenue to gain immediate relief from
fairly traded imports.
While the President was given more statutory choices to meet in-
creased competition, Presidential discretion was curbed. Amendments
to section 20324 curbed the President's discretion to reject all ITC rec-
ommendations for relief in favor of providing no relief at all. Now, by
passing a joint resolution, Congress can implement the ITC recommen-
dations regardless of the President's decision.82 5
In terms of Presidential discretion, the 1988 amendments to sec-
tion 301 have an even more dramatic effect. The 1988 Act completely
transferred the section 301 authority from the President to the U.S.
Trade Representative. 32 8 The Act also makes it mandatory for the
U.S.T.R. to act to remedy the denial of rights under a trade agree-
ment.32 To underscore Congressional concern that U.S. trade interests
are pursued vigorously, the new section 310 requires the U.S.T.R. to
report annually on the office's trade liberalization objectives.32 8 This re-
port must describe major barriers and trade distorting practices which
impair U.S. exports and the countries which engage in these prac-
tices.329 Following the submission of the report, the U.S.T.R. must in-
vestigate each of the cited countries to determine the impact of their
unfair trade practices. This investigation is designed to lead to the
318. See id., § 1401 at § 203(a)(3)(G) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 2253).
319. See id., § 203(e)(1)(B).
320. See id., § 204(a). The ITC must report to Congress at two-year intervals on
the progress made toward adjustment. See id., § 202(a)(2).
321. See id., § 202(b)(2)(A).
322. See id., § 202(b)(3)(B).
323. See id., § 202(d)(3).
324. See id., § 203(c).
325. See id.
326. See Pub. L. No. 100-418, title I, Aug. 3, 1988, § 1301 at § 301.
327. See id., § 301(a)(l).
328. Id., § 310.
329. Id., § 310(a)(1).
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elimination of these practices, or compensation for them, over a three-
year period."'
As far as remedies are concerned, imposition of duties is preferred
to other forms of import restrictions. 3 1 While this approach might ben-
efit semiconductor producers, it will have little beneficial effect for
semiconductor users; the result will still be higher prices for finished
products.
It remains to be seen how well the Act's emphasis on mandatory
responses to protect what is perceived as distinctly national industries
will mesh with reality. National boundaries are beginning to blur and
lose significance in the high technology sectors. From 1985 to 1987,
Japanese semiconductor companies signed more than one hundred
agreements with foreign counterparts to create joint ventures, technol-
ogy or marketing agreements, and equity partnerships.3 2 The growing
internationalization of the semiconductor industry is beginning to make
the country of origin relatively unimportant.
While appealing to Washington for help, the industry has also
been pursuing alliances with its rivals overseas, simply as a measure of
good business. For example, Motorola and Toshiba have a joint venture
based on the former's lead in microprocessor technology and the lat-
ter's lead in memory chips.3 3 National Semiconductor designs, makes,
and sells semiconductors in Japan with NMB Semiconductor; Honey-
well, Compagnie des Machines Bull of France, and NEC cooperate on
supercomputers; and Advanced MicroDevices has a marketing and
technology agreement covering Sony digital chips as well as a sourcing
agreement with the West German Siemens Corp.334
Furthermore, the semiconductor pact has reinforced the need for
both U.S. and Japanese companies to have plants in each other's coun-
try. With plants in the United States, the Japanese get tariff-free sales
of their U.S.-produced semiconductors. With joint ventures in Japan,
U.S. producers get access to Japanese manufacturing technology. In-
deed, because the pact increased the price of semiconductors, many
manufacturers have been driven out of both the United States and Ja-
pan and into other markets beyond the reach of the U.S. and Japanese
regulators.335 Despite this growing internationalization, U.S. firms still
330. See id., § 310(c).
331. See id., § 301(c)(5)(A).
332. See JAPAN. EcoN J., supra note 165, at 69-90.
333. See Dallmeyer, supra note 1, at 52.
334. Id.
335. See supra note 153.
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hold 80 percent of the U.S. semiconductor market." 6
If the real goal is to make the U.S. semiconductor industry com-
petitive again, government and industry must first accept the interna-
tionalization of high technology. Industry should not complain about
foreign investment when it is key to its development. One government
report suggests that the U.S. industry's market share problems are self-
inflicted. 37 At the time that Japanese industry, with government and
academic support, adopted a long-term strategy to target and dominate
certain markets, the approach was equally available to U.S. industry.
The United States was once in a position to enforce virtually any semi-
conductor market strategy it chose, having invented the technology,
controlled the leading-edge research, dominated the relevant education,
held the largest world market share, and consumed the majority of the
product.338
More important, rather than relying on a series of ad hoc handouts,
government and industry should begin a coherent effort to develop an
integrated strategy that will address future structural problems. Both
must recognize that the semiconductor industry is inherently cyclical,
with booms and busts that out pace government attempts to reorder the
situation. Additionally, both sides must realize that the attrition of
semiconductor firms is not necessarily bad if it yields a more efficient
industry.
The U.S. industry is slowly restructuring and consolidating to be-
come more competitive and vertically integrated like its overseas rivals.
Congress has taken some steps to facilitate cooperative research among
U.S. companies by easing antitrust restrictions. In October 1984, the
National Cooperative Research Act became law. 3 9 Now the legality of
research and development cooperation is evaluated on a case-by-case
basis under a "rule of reason," a definite improvement on the former
per se illegality of such cooperative ventures.340 The potential liability
of the consortium is limited to actual damages, rather than treble dam-
ages assessed for other forms of anticompetitive practices.34' Addition-
ally, if a challenge to the legality of the research consortium fails, the
losing challenger must pay the defendant's litigation expenses. 42 In the
first year since its passage, more than forty consortia had filed with the
336. Washington Post, Mar. 5, 1987, at El.
337. DSB REPORT, supra note 3, at 75.
338. Id.
339. 98 Stat. 1815, Pub. L. No. 98-462, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4305.
340. See id. at 1816, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 4302.
341. See id., § 4(a), 15 U.S.C. § 4303.
342. See Davis, R&D Consortia, HIGH TECHNOLOGY, Oct. 1985, at 42-43.
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office of the Attorney General and the FTC for protection under the
Act.34 3
It is apparent that the government has a stake in the health of the
U.S. electronics industry. By the year 2000, this semiconductor-depen-
dent sector of the economy will account for 25 percent of the gross
national product. 344 In 1986 alone, Congress allocated approximately
$400 million to support semiconductor R&D in Defense Department
laboratories and agencies, by defense contractors, and through Na-
tional Science Foundation grants for basic research in universities.3 4"
Additionally Congress allocated $500 million to support semiconductor
manufacturing technology R&D over the next five years. 46
Problems in obtaining R&D funding at reasonable interest rates,
however, turn on the potential of substantial reduction of the federal
budget deficit. Another long-term problem that must be faced is the
decline in technical education in the United States. The effort under-
way to support centers of excellence in semiconductor science at U.S.
universities is a step in the right direction, but it must go beyond engi-
neering students and reach the labor force who must cope with increas-
ingly technical manufacturing plants.
These long-term issues are not easy to solve, nor do they offer
flashy political gratification in the short run, but they must be dealt
with and dealt with soon. Otherwise, the United States faces the pros-
pect of endless repetitions of failed attempts to halt the inevitable inter-
nationalization and restructuring of the world high-technology sectors.
343. Id. at 45. For further discussions of the Chip Consortium Concept, see Pol-
lack, Big Goal and Hurdles for New Chip Maker, New York Times, July 13, 1989, at
21; Melloan, Chipping Away at Good Old-Fashioned Competition, Wall St. J., July
11, 1989 at A-21; Shaffer, Let a Thousand Companies Fight, New York Times, July
9, 1989, at F-2; Noyce, Cooperation is the Best Way to Beat Japan, id.
344. Sumney & Burger, Revitalizing the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, ISSUES IN
SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, Summer 1987, at 32-41, 33.
345. See CBO, supra note 5, at 59-72.
346. See Wall St. J., Jan. 27, 1988, at 8; ELECTRONICS NEWS, Dec. 21, 1987, at
